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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 17,607

ROGER C. HIGGS, KURT MATHIA,
and GEORGE C. MELIS,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking judicial review, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §67-17-6(5), of an administrative decision
entered in an employee grievance proceeding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant-appellees (grievants) initiated grievance
proceedings against the plaintiff-appellant {Department)
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §67-17-6, and their grievances
were heard according to the five-step procedure outlined therein.

Part of the step-five decision rendered by Dr. A. J. Wann,

State Hearing Officer, was adverse to the Department.

The

Department therefore filed a complaint with the Third Judicial
District Court seeking judicial review of the administrative
decision (R.2-4), and the grievants moved to dismiss on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since §67-19-25 (enacted after the step-five hearing
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had been scheduled) did not provide for an appeal by the
Department from the step-five decision (R.12-21).

The Honorable

Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge, granted the grievants' motion
(R. 36-36) .

(A copy of the decision is attached hereto as

Appendix "A".)

The Department appeals from the dismissal of

its complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks to have its complaint
reinstated, permitting judicial review of the administrative
decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Should a new statute be applied to proceedings commenced

and nearly completed under the predecessor statute, where such
would deprive the parties of any right of appeal?
2.

May a statute be applied retroactively where the

legislature has not expressly so provided?
3.

Does the Constitutional right of appeal apply to

proceedings held before an administrative tribunal?
4.

Did the express agreement of the parties have the effect

of waiving the extra administrative step permitted under the new
statute?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August and September of 1978, the defendants-respondents lgrievants) initiated employee grievance proceedings
against the plaintiff-appellant (Department)

(R.41).

The

grievants objected to actions taken (including an investigation)
by the Department in response to the grievants' offer to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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provide consulting services to child support enforcement
agencies in other states.

The nature of the offered consulting

work was very similar to the work the grievants had been
employed to provide for the Department; the Department's
investigation was designed to determine whether a conflict
of interest existed.

(R. 41, 48)

When the grievants began the grievance procedures against
the Department, Utah law provided for a five-step grievance
procedure:

(1) an oral discussion with the grievant's immedi-

ate supervisor;

(2) a written appeal to the grievant's immedi-

ate supervisor;

(3) a written appeal to the grievant's second-

level supervisor;

(4) a written appeal to and hearing before

the department head; and (5) a written appeal to and hearing
before the state grievance hearing officer.
§67-17-6 (repealed 1979).

These grievance procedures were

available only to current state employees.
§67-17-5 (repealed 1979).

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann.

Appeal of dismissal or termination

could be made to the Merit Council.

Utah Code Ann. §67-13-14

(repealed 1979).
Grievant Matthia completed Steps 1 through 4 of the grievance
procedure (R.42).

Grievants Higgs and Melis completed steps

1 through 3, but their employment with the Department terminated
before the Step 4 hearing was held.

~.

41).

Higgs and Melis

appealed their termination to the Merit Council, but subsequently
dropped that appeal and request for reinstatement (R.43,
also R. 47).

(The hearings appealed from, therefore, did

not address the issue of whether the grievants should be
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~

reinstated to their former positions; rather, at issue was
the propriety of the steps taken to investigate the grievants'
conduct.)

All the grievants appealed to the State Hearing

Officer for a Step 5 hearing.

tR.42-44).

At a prehearing conference held on April 24, 1979, before
the newly-appointed State Hearing Officer, Dr. Wann, it was
1i

I

agreed by all present (including all the parties to this

I

(

action) that the grievances of Higgs and Melis were to be

ii

referred back to the 4th level for a hearing, and that the

ii
I

hearing of Matthia tand also of Higgs and Melis if they

I

chose to appeal the 4th level decision) would be heard by

I'I

Dr. Wann on July 30 through August 3, 1979.

(R. 43).

"It was further agreed by all concerned that these cases
should be heard through to their final resolution in accordance
with the provisions of the then governing statute," Chapter 17
of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, even though the parties were
aware that the Legislature was considering a new management
act, Senate Bill 179, which would, if enacted, become effective
during the pendency of these proceedings.

(R.

44)

After the grievance process was four-fifths complete
and after the Step 5 hearing had been scheduled, but before
it was actually held, Senate Bill 179 was signed into law
by the Governor, with an effective date of July 1, 1979.

The

new law, codified as Chapter 19 of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated,
provides for a six-step procedure for the resolution of grievances.
!:

Steps l through 5 are essentially the same as under the old

, I

law.

However, the statute provided that only an employee,

'I

I
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and not an agency, could appeal from Step 5 to the new Step
6.

Step 6 provided for an appeal and hearing before a

personnel review board created by the new law.

The appeal

apparently was to be based on the record from the Step 5 hearing
and also on new evidence and testimony presented before the
personnel review board.
Grievants Higgs and Melis were not satisfied with the
results at Step 4, and appealed to Step 5.

On July 3, the

Department obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking a restraining order ordering Higgs and Melis to show cause why they
should not be restrained from proceeding with the Step 5
hearing.

One of the bases of the Order to Show Cause was

that the new statute had eliminated the state hearing officer
position held by Dr. Wann and that the new procedural provisions were now in effect.

(R.

44}.

The Third District Court Judge David K. Winder denied
the request for a restraining order (R.451, implicitly
agreeing that the "old" law would continue to govern the
proceedings.
The Step 5 hearing was held as scheduled, with testimony
being heard over a three-day period

~.46).

Over four

months later, Dr. Wann entered his decision, denying four
and sustaining five of the nine grievances presented.

(R.62).

As authorized by Utah Code Ann. §67-17-6(5), the Department
filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court appealing
from the administrative decision rendered by Dr. Wann (R.2-4).
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The Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, granted the
grievants' Motion to Dismiss, stating that the Department
had not exhausted all available administrative remedies as
provided by the "new" statute lR. 36-37) .

The Department properly

perfected this appeal from the decision of the District Court
(R. 65).

Since the filing of this appeal, the Legislature has again
changed the employee grievance laws.

The new law, S.B. 271,

signed by the Governor on March 20, 1981, although permitting
an agency to appeal from Step 5 to Step 6, provides no avenue
of appeal on either the law or the facts if the Step 6 decision
is adverse to the agency.
The 1981 law also changes Step 6 from a hearing in which
evidence and testimony could be taken to one based wholly on
the record from the Step 5 hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah has provided by statute that the repeal of any
statute does not affect any proceeding commenced under the
statute repealed, and that no statute is retroactive unless
expressly so declared by the Legislature.

This court has

established that the law is to be fixed as of the conunencement
of an action.

Where procedural statutes have been applied to

pending actions, it has been only to preserve a right of
appeal, which this court has declared to be a valuable and
constitutional right.

Where application of a new procedural

statute would deprive a party of the right to appeal, this
court has held that such statutes do not apply to pending
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actions.
Judicial economy and efficiency require that the law not
be changed during the pendency of an action.

Foreseeing such

a change, the parties to this action stipulated and agreed to
conclude the proceedings according to the law in effect when
they were commenced.

That agreement should be honored by

the courts.
For the reasons stated, the order of the district court
incorrectly applied the new statute to proceedings commenced
and nearly completed under the old, and, therefore, the decision
of the district court should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A NEW STATUTE WILL NOT APPLY TO PROCEEDINGS
ALREADY COMMENCED IF SO DOING WILL LIMIT THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL.
Utah has provided by statute that "[t]he repeal of a
statute does not •

affect • • • any proceeding conunenced

under or by virtue of the statute repealed."
Ann. §68-3-5 (1978).

Utah Code

The rule is not limited to only those

statutes that affect substantive rights--it speaks of any
proceeding.

It is a rule of construction that applies to

all statutes in Utah.
Case law supports this rule.

In Archer v. Utah

State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964), a case
very similar to the one at bar, the plaintiff-appellant filed
a complaint seeking judicial review of an action by the
defendant-appellee Utah State Land Board.

After the original
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complaint was filed but before an amended complaint could be
filed, the Legislature passed a bill providing for an administrative review of Land Board actions.
procedural in nature.

The change was clearly

The defendant Land Board moved for

dismissal on the grounds that the court now lacked jurisdiction,
apparently alleging that the plaintiff had not exhausted the
administrative remedies made available, by the new statute,
after the proceeding was commenced.

This Court reversed,

stating that:
This question can best be resolved by remarking
that ordinarily the facts and the law in a given
lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the
filing of the original complaint. We see no
good reason for departing from the basic rule in
this case.
392 P.2d at 624.
Although the quote from Archer speaks of fixing the law as
of the time of the original complaint, the same reasoning that
led to that holding would also require that the law in the
instant case be fixed as of the time the grievance proceedings
were initiated.
The courts have occasionally departed from this rule,
but only if necessary to preserve a right of appeal.

An

example is Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117
(19091.

In that case, the district judge made findings of

fact and conclusions of law on March 16, 1907.

Nine days later,

on March 25, an amendment went into effect authorizing the
judge to make additional findings of fact or conclusions of law
after the entry of judgment.

,,
lj

On June 8, the losing party
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moved the court to make additional findings, and the court ook
the motion under advisement.

On September 21, 1907, the court

finally entered additional findings of fact, but refused to
enter additional conclusions of law.
Meanwhile, more than six months lthe time for taking an
appeal to the Supreme Court) had passed since the original
entry of judgment.

The losing party took its appeal, within

six months of the second judgment, from the judge's refusal to
enter additional conclusions of law.
The appellee argued that the judge had no authority to
enter additional findings, as the new statute was passed after
judgment had been entered, and that therefore the appeal had
not been timely made.
The court, in order to preserve the appellant's right to
appeal, allowed the new statute to apply, stating that:
Every case must, to a considerable extent,
depend on its own circumstances. General
words in remedial statutes may be applied
to past transactions and pending cases,
according to all indications of legislative
intent, and this may be greatly influenced
by considerations of convenience, reasonableness and justice.
104 P. at 119-120 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
The Court concluded:
(A]s such amendment pertained merely to a
matter of procedure, we are clearly of the
opinion that the amendment applied to this
as well as to all the pending actions.
Moreover, the right to an appeal is a constitutional, as well as a valuable right and
ought not to be denied except where it is
clear the right does not exist, or has been
lost or abandoned. The motion to dismiss
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the appeal is therefore denied.
104 P. at 120.
Therefore, it appears that new laws will be applied to
pending actions if necessary to preserve a right of appeal.
However, the new law will not be applied if its application will
serve to deny the right of appeal.
This conclusion is born out in Industrial Commission v. Agee,
56 Utah 63, 189 P. 414

(1920), where the Court declined to apply

a new procedural statute to a pending action.
In that case a widow applied to the Industrial Commission
for compensation for the death of her husband.

The Commission

denied the claim, and the widow appealed (in September 1918) to
the district court, as authorized by the statute then in force.
The Commission's demurrer to the widow's complaint was sustained
by the district court, and this court reversed and sent the
case back.

There were additional procedural maneuverings.

During the pendency of the action, the Legislature passed an
act providing that appeals from the Industrial Commission must
be made to the Supreme Court within 30 days, and that no other
court had jurisdiction to review Commission decisions.

(The 30-

day time for appeal had long since passed.)
The Industrial Commission petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of prohibition to stop the district judge (Agee)
from proceeding to exercise jurisdiction, citing several
cases (including Boucofski, supra) in support of the proposition
that procedural statutes are to be applied to pending actions,
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L

and that therefore the district court no longer had jurisdiction.
The Court held that the new procedural statute did not
apply to actions pending at its enactment, stating that:
[T]he Constitution of the state of Utah
guarantees every litigant the right of
appeal . • . ; that to hold, under the circumstances, that the district court is
without jurisdiction would in effect deprive the claimant of any legal remedy and
nullify the express guaranty of our Constitution of the right of the defendant to
have her day in court.
189 P. at 415.
The Court explained that the Legislature, when it enacted
the new statute, had in mind the predecessors of three statutes,
Utah Code Ann. §§68-3-5, 68-3-21, and 68-3-3, which respectively state that "[t]he repeal of a statute does not

• • affect

• • • any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue
of the statute repealed," that statutes "are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes
and to promote justice," and that "[no statute] is retroactive
unless expressly so declared."

The Court also considered

the case of Boucofski, supra, where a procedural enactment
had been applied to a pending action.
The Court concluded that these authorities compelled
the conclusion that, since to apply the new statute to pending
actions would deprive the appellant of the right of appeal,
the procedural provisions of the new statute should be applied
only to future cases.
In the instant case, the Department's only avenue of
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(,

appeal is to the District Court under the old law.

Section

67-19-25(6) provides that an appeal from a step-five hearing
must be made within 10 working days following the receipt of
the step-five decision.

Dr. Wann entered his decision on

January 15, 1980, and it was mailed to the parties on January
28, 1981.

The Department of Social Services, acting under the

belief that the parties would honor their stipulation (that
the "old" law would govern the proceedings), did not make any
appeal to Step-six, but instead proceeded as authorized under
Chapter 17.

There, the new step-six hearing is not available

to the Department, as the time for perfecting an appeal to the
Personnel Review Board under the new statute has passed.
If the Supreme Court were to now hold that the proceedings
should henceforth be conducted in accordance with the new law,
the Department will have no avenue of appeal.
Therefore, in harmony with the above-cited cases, the new
Chapter 19 of Title 67 should not be held to govern the
grievance proceedings commenced and nearly completed before
its effective date.

Those grievance proceedings should be

concluded, as they commenced, pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 17 of Title 67.
POINT II
THE NEW GRIEVANCE LAW IS SILENT AS TO ITS
APPLICATION TO PENDING PROCEEDINGS, THEREFOffi
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW IS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.
No express provision of Chapter 19, of Title 67 provides
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that the procedure created therein shall have retroactive
effect with respect to outstanding grievance procedures
initiated prior to the effective date of that Chapter.

The law

of Utah is abundantly clear that absent express legislative
mandate requiring retroactive application of newly enacted
statutory provisions, such provisions will be deemed prospectively applicable only.

The Utah Code has so provided since

1898:
No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
lU.C.A. §68-3-3, emphasis added.)

See also, Union Pacific

Railroad Company v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah2d 101, 329 P.2d 398,
399 (1958), footnote 11.
The Utah Supreme Court has undeviatingly adhered to this
proposition.

In Union Pacific Railroad Company,

~·

the

Court noted:
[A]s to any statutory question, Utah's policy
demands the inclusion of an express authorization to justify any restrospective application
of a statute.
~Id., 329 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added).
Thus, unless the particular enactment expressly provides
for retroactive application, its operation and effect are
deemed prospective only.

In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337,

148 P.2d 340, 341 (1944),

~

also, McCarrey v. Utah State

Teachers' Retirement Board, 111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725, 726
(_1947).
Thus, because Chapter 19 of Title 67 contains no provision
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whatsoever expressly mandating retroactive application of the
substantive and procedural rights contained therein, under no
conceivable circumstance could such provisions be deemed to
operate retroactively.

Furthermore, the grievance procedures

initiated by these defendants were more than four-fifths
complete as of the effective date of Chapter 19.

The law is

well-settled in Utah that the facts and law in a given lawsuit
are to be applied as of the date of the initiation of the action.
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah2d 321, 392 P.2d 622,
624 (1967) .
In addition, if Chapter 19 is applied retroactively as
required by the district court, it would operate to deprive
the Department of a valuable vested right of appeal embodied
in Chapter 17.

See Utah Code Ann. §67-17-6(5).

The general

rules, univerally recognized, absolutely prohibits the retroactive application of newly enacted statutory provisions when
such would operate as a deprivation or other impairment of
vested rights.

73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §349 (1974).

This

Court has already considered the issue of whether newly
enacted statutory provisions, not expressly made retroactive.
This Court has stated:

I

But more important than any of the above is
the oft proclaimed salutary principle:
that
ours is a government of laws and not of men.
Accordingly, the law should not be changed
simply because of the will or desire of judges
as to what the law is or ought to be. Much
less so, should it be so changed during-ule
course of a particular proceeding to have a
retroactive effect thereon. Notwithstanding
the fact that the change the state advocates

' I

11

!
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would vindicate the position taken in the
dissent referred to, to so rule in this
case retroactively would violate what we
regard as a higher principle:
that of
honoring the established law.
If there is
to be such a change in the law, whether by
legislative act or by judicial decision, it
seems that it should have only prospective
effect and that fairness and good conscience
require that it should not be applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they
existed at the time a particular controversy
arose.
State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 lUtah 1977, emphasis added).
Having begun their grievances under Chapter 17, Title 67,
the grievants are bound by the procedural provisions contained
therein.

Section 67-17-6(5) outlines the procedures to be

followed during the course of and subsequent to the step-five
administrative hearing.
The section recognizes a statutory right of appeal from
the decision of the step-five hearing officer, both in favor of
the aggrieved employee and in favor of the State and its
agencies.

Pursuant to the authority of this section of the

Code, the Department filed this action on June 13, 1980.

The

Department's complaint vested the district court with jurisdiction to consider the Department's appeal of the decision
of the hearing officer at the step-five administrative hearing,
and this Court should reverse the district court's dismissal
of the Department's complaint.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS A STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF APPEAL.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
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[T]he right to an appeal is a constitutional,
as well as a valuable right and ought not to
be denied except where it is clear the right
does not exist, or has been lost or abandoned.
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 120 ll909).
Therefore, any doubts the district court may have had regarding
the Department's right to appeal the adverse administrative
decision should have been resolved in favor of allowing the
appeal.
This right of appeal was reaffirmed in the recent case
of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).
The plaintiff•s business license had been revoked, and she
protested in various proceedings, including an administrative
hearing before the defendant Commission at which the plaintiff
was represented by counsel.

The plaintiff petitioned the

district court for a trial de novo, rather than for a review of
the record as was done in the instant case.

This court, although

denying the trial de novo the plaintiff requested, did hold
that the plaintiff had a right to have a court review the
record.

The court stated:
[W]e are in accord with the proposition that
a party who deems himself to be wronged by
unlawful or capricious and arbitrary action
of a public official or department of government does and should have a right of access
to the courts to review and test the validity
of his contention.

555 P.2d at 283.
The court explained that this right of review is implemented through the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 7,
which provides:

that "[t]he District Court shall have . . .
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appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and a supervisory control of the same . . . "
The fact that the plaintiff-appellant at bar is a
governmental entity rather than a natural person should not
affect its right to a review of a decision rendered by another
governmental entity.

The court in Peatross stated that a

"party" had a right of access to the courts to seek review of
the administrative decision.

The rules of construction for

the Utah statutes provide that "[t]he word 'person' includes
bodies politic . • • "Utah Code Ann. §68-3-12(5) (1978).

These

authorities indicate that it is the policy of this state that
political entities have the same rights as natural persons.
When the grievants commenced their proceedings against the
Department, Utah law provided that both parties had the right to
seek review in the courts of the decision rendered by the administrative tribunals.

The Utah Constitution explicitly provides

that the district court has appellate jurisdiction over all
inferior tribunals.

It was error for the district court to hold

that the new grievance law, enacted when these proceedings were
nearly complete, deprived the court of its constitutionallyconferred jurisdiction to review Dr. Wann's decision.

The order

dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint should therefore
be reversed.
POINT IV
BY EXPRESS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES WAIVED
THE ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL STEPS UNDER THE
NEW GRIEVANCE LAW.
Both the old (Utah Code Ann. §67-17-41 and the new (Utah
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Code Ann. §67-19-23) grievance laws provide that the parties
may, by mutual agreement, waive any of the steps of the
grievance procedure.

To prevent fraud, the statute requires

that the waiver be evidenced by a writing.

This requirement

is met by the signed decision of Dr. Wann which states that
"[I]t was further agreed by all concerned that these cases
should be heard through to their final resolution in accordance
(R.44).

with the provisions of the then governing statute

It is a general rule that, although parties may not stipulate as to points of law or to invest a court with jurisdiction
which it would not otherwise have, parties may stipulate to
matters "relating merely to the conduct of a pending proceeding."
73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations §4 (19741, First of Denver Mortgage
Investors v. C. N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527
(Utah 1979).
stipulations.

The courts are ordinarily bound by those
600 P.2d at 527.

It was established in the previous argument that the
Utah Constitution confers jurisdiction on the district courts
to review the decisions of all inferior tribunals.
Art. VIII §7.

Utah Const.

The law under which these proceedings were had

specifically allowed the parties to waive any additional appeal
steps that might exist (Utah Code Ann. §67-17-4), and in any
event, such a stipulation could not be considered a matter of
law, but rather simply a matter "relating merely to the conduct
of a pending proceeding."

Therefore, the stipulation of the

parties did not in anyway encroach upon the domain of the
court, and it should have been honored.
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To deny effect to the stipulation would also work a great
injustice upon the Department.

In reliance on the express

agreement of the parties that the proceedings would continue
to be held according to Chapter 17, the Department looked to
that statute to determine its right of appeal and the procedux-e
for taking such appeal.

Since the time for taking an appeal

under the new Chapter 19 has now passed, a failure to honor the
stipulation of the parties would serve to deny the Department
of even the minimal right of appeal granted by Chapter 19,
and would leave them caught between two laws with absolutely
no remedy.

The decision of the district court denying effect

to the stipulation was therefore error, and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The law concerning employee grievance proceedings against
the State is apparently in a state of flux.

Since the

grievants initiated their complaints against the Department
in 1978, the law has been changed twice.

The first change

added an extra step to the hearing process.
change changed the nature of that extra step.

The second
In reliance on

a stipulation of the parties, the Department determined its
right of appeal from the original law.

It is at best uncertain

whether they can now return and attempt to file an appeal,
over a year late, under the new law.

It is also uncertain

whether, if such an appeal were taken, the step-six hearing
would be conducted as provided at the time the grievants
perfected their appeal from the step-five decision (a hearing
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based on the record and on new testimony and evidence) or
whether the 1981 change in the law would apply (a hearing
based solely on the record) .
No proceeding can be efficiently conducted if the law
under which it is held is so frequently changed.

The Legislature

has recognized this, and specifically provided that a repeal
of a statute does not affect any proceeding commenced under the
statute repealed.

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-5 ll978).

This court

has stated that laws should not be changed during the course of
a particular proceeding.
(Utah 1977).

State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102

This rule is especially important where the

valuable and constitutional right of appeal is at stake.
For the reasons above stated, the parties are in need of
guidance from this Court concerning which law should apply to
these proceedings.

This Court should hold that these proceedings

may be completed as they commenced pursuant to Chapter 17 of
Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, and that therefore the order
of the district court dismissing the Department's complaint
should be reversed and the complaint reinstated.
Respectfully submitted this 2~~4 day of June, 1981.

--?/? ~
~~
DON R. PETER~~for:

...

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of PlaintiffAppellant to Ms. Kathryn Collard, Attorney for Defendants-
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Respondents, 417 Church Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
this

0'76f....?aay of June, 1981.
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